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UTAHR. APP. P. 24(A)(1) STATEMENT OF ALL PARTIES 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE(S) 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(1) STATEMENT OF ALL 
PARTIES TO THE ACTION i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii-iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv-v 
CASE LAW .....iv 
STATUTES & RULES v 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
III. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 2 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS 2 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 4 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW & DISPOSITION 4 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
VIII. ARGUMENT 11 
A. LWP's Participation in the Mediation entitles it to treat all Portions of the 
Mediation as Confidential 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Both the Benefits and the Burdens of Confidentiality Apply to 
LWP 12 
2. All Mediation Discussions Are Confidential 14 
B. Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Makes 
Clear that the Agreements Made In Such Mediations Must Be 
Reduced to Writing to be Enforceable 18 
1. Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Requires That Agreements be Reduced to 
Writing 19 
2. Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Plainly States That 
Statements Made in Settlement Negotiations Are Not Admissible 
Evidence 21 
C. Courts from Other Jurisdictions Likewise Treat Mediations as 
Confidential and This Court Should Follow Its Own Precedent and 
The Lead of Other Jurisdictions and Find All Mediation Discussions 
Confidential and Oral Agreements Not Enforceable 23 
IX. CONCLUSION 31 
X. STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT. 31 
XI. ADDENDUM 33-36 
XII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......... ;............ 37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW 
PAGE(S) 
Anderson v. United Parcel Service, 96 P.3d 903 (Utah 2004) 2, 16 
Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1992) 15, 25, 26 
Cox v. Krammer, 76 P.3d 184 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 1, 18, 19 
In re Acceptance Insurance Company, 33 S.W.3d443 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000) 
26,31 
Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 31 
Reno v. Haler. 734N.E.2d 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 26 
Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 28,29,31 
Spencer v. Spencer, 72N.E.2d 661 (Ct. App. Ind. 2001) 26, 27 
Regents of the University of California v. Sumner, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, (Cal. Dist. 
CtApp. 1996) 30 
Uniform Mediation Act, Section 6(a)(l)(2001) 25 
Vernon v. Action, 732 NE.2d 805 (Ind. 200) 23, 24, 25, 31 
Wilmington Hospitality, L.L.C. v. New Castle County, 788 A.2d 536 (Del. Ch. 
2001) 27, 28,30,31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES & RULES 
PAGEfSV 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-8 (2002) 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 31 
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, Rule 101 
(2002) 2,4, 10, 18, 19,20,21 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202 et seq 7 
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (2002) .2, 4, 10, 21, 23 
Rules 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1, 2, 3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this case by virtue of granting Petitioner 
LWP, Solutions Inc.'s Petition for Discretionary Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 5. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution 
require that agreements reached in the course of mediation be reduced to some 
form of writing. 
"Statutory Construction is a question of law and is reviewed by the Court de 
novo. When interpreting court rules, we apply our rules of statutory construction 
with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are passed as a whole and not in 
parts or sections. [0]ur primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the 
rule-making body and to render all parts [of the rule] relevant and meaningful." 
Cox v. Krammer. 76 P.3d 184, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)(alterations original). 
2. Whether Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 lb-8 (2002) requires that all 
discussions among participants at a mediation be kept confidential so that such 
mediation discussions cannot be used to prove the existence of an alleged oral 
agreement. 
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"Matters of statutory construction . . . are questions of law that we review for 
correctness." Anderson v. United Parcel Service 96 P.3d 903, 906 (Utah 2004). 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it interpreted Utah Revised Statute 
Section 78-3lb-8, as recognizing "confidential" and "non-confidential" 
components of mediation discussions. "Matters of statutory construction . . . are 
questions of law that we review for correctness." IdL 
III. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 
The issues set forth herein were preserved in the trial court by virtue of a 
request to immediately certify the trial courts ruling for interlocutory appeal. 
R213: 45:24 - 46:6. When the trial court denied the request, Petitioner filed its 
Petition for Discretionary Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to Utah Rules o f 
Appellate Procedure Rule 5. R205. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3lb-8 (2002). 
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, Rule 101. 
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court ordered that LWP Solutions, Inc. 's ("LWP") counsel be 
deposed and forced to testify regarding statements and negotiation that took place 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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within the confines of mediation in direct violation of Utah Code § 78-3 lb-8 
(2002) which deems all mediation discussions confidential. The purpose of this 
deposition was to prove the existence of an oral agreement between LWP and Mr. 
Reese that Mr. Reese alleged was reached and which LWP denies. LWP filed a 
petition for discretionary interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, which this Court granted. 
LWP Solutions, Inc. asks this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling and 
find that all mediation discussions are confide ntial and cannot be revealed to third 
parties even if introduced to prove the existence of an oral contract. Moreover, 
LWP asks that the Court find that the rules regulating Alternative Dispute 
Resolution ("ADR") require mediation participants to reduce t heir agreements to 
written form so as to avoid disputes such as the one between Mr. Reese and LWP. 
Allowing participants to enforce alleged oral agreements made within the confines 
of mediation would undermine the confidentiality requirements of mediation and 
would contravene ADR rules that allow participants to disengage in settlement 
discussions at any time prior to the execution of a written document. Moreover, 
allowing for an exception to confidentiality to prove oral agreements would create 
an exception that swallows the rule. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves statutory construction of Utah Code Ann. § 78 -31b-8; the 
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, Rule 101; and Rule 
408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence so as to determine whether the rules of 
confidentiality surrounding mediations precludes the introduction of evidence from 
within a mediation to enforce a purported oral agreement reached therein. The trial 
court erroneously allowed Mr. Reese to introduce evidence rega rding an alleged 
oral agreement and this Court should reverse and remand with direction that Mr. 
Reese's Motion to Enforce Settlement be dismissed with prejudice for lack of 
admissible evidence in support thereof. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW & DISPOSITION 
Plaintiff Murlyn Craig Reese filed a motion to enforce a settlement 
agreement that he alleged was reached during a mediation with Defendant, Tingey 
Construction and LWP Solutions, Inc., third-party lien holder and real party in 
interest. A hearing was held on Mr. Reese's motion to enforce. R213. At the 
hearing, LWP asserted that Rule of Evidence 408, Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of 
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution and Utah Code Ann. § 78 -31b-8 
prohibited the disclosure of discussions ma de during a mediation. R213: 3:25; 
6:20. The trial court was not persuaded by LWP's arguments and found that there 
were "confidential" and "non-confidential" components of mediation and that Mr. 
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Reese was free to introduce evidence regarding the "non -confidential" portions of 
mediation. LWP renewed its objections and asked the court to certify the matter 
for interlocutory appeal and the trial court denied this request. R213:45:24 -46:6. 
The trial court provided Mr. Reese with the option to either call LWP's counsel to 
the stand at that very moment or depose her at a later date. R213:43:25 -44:12. Mr. 
Reese chose to depose LWP's counsel and the hearing concluded. R213:44:13 -15. 
Subsequently, LWP filed a motion to intervene seeking to clarify its role i n 
the suit and to ensure that it had standing to appeal the trial court's ruling. R135. 
Mr. Reese objected to LWP intervening in the suit. R157. 
LWP also submitted a proposed order to the court in an attempt to solidify 
the breadth of the court's ruling. In this proposed order, LWP made it very clear 
that LWP's counsel would not be required to testify in violation of attorney -client 
privilege. R150-152; R170-73. Mr. Reese again objected. R140. 
During the hearing, Mr. Reese's counsel purported that one of his secretaries 
who sat near the foyer during the mediation among the parties overheard LWP's 
counsel speaking with her client and could testify in support of an oral agreement. 
R213: 40:6-12. Mr. Reese also sought leave to testify about the conversations that 
he "overheard." Ibid. LWP filed a motion with the court seeking exclusion of this 
evidence on the ground that it was protected by attorney -client privilege and this 
privilege was not waived by an eavesdropper. R.8 fn 2 - R9; R170-73. 
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Despite LWP's objections, the trial court executed the proposed order 
tendered by Mr. Reese. R179-181. This order did not explain with any detail the 
scope of the deposition of LWP's counsel. R179-181. Most importantly, the 
executed order was silent on the issue of whether LWP's counsel would be 
required to violate attorney-client privilege and testify about her discussions with 
her client. Rl 79-181. It also failed to rule on the issue of whether opposing 
counsel's secretary would be allowed to testify about what she claims she 
overheard LWP's counsel say. R179-181. 
The court also failed to rule on LWP's motion to intervene in the suit prior 
to entering the above-described order. R135; R138 and R197-198. As a 
consequence, LWP was forced to file a motion for extraordinary writ to protect its 
interest. R195. As a precaution, LWP also filed a motion for discretionary 
interlocutory appeal and a motion to quash the deposition notice for Ms. Acosta, 
LWP's counsel.1 R185-187. Ultimately, the trial court allowed LWP to intervene 
in the suit and LWP's petition for discretionary interlocutory appeal was granted 
by the Court. R197-198; R205-206. 
1
 LWP Solutions, Inc. also filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ and Rule 8A 
Emergency Relief Petition. R.195. This request was denied by the Utah Supreme 
Court. R202. 
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VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 24, 2000, Mr. Reese was invovled in a work-related 
accident when he fell from a third-story balcony while attempting to raise a 
toolbox from the ground using an electrical cord. R2. Mr. Reese had leaned on a 
temporary railing while attempting to raise his tools. R2. The temporary railing 
gave way and Mr. Reese fell. He sustained significant injury to his leg. R2. As 
Mr. Reese was in the course and scope of his employment, all medical expenses 
related to this injury were covered by Mr. Reese's employer's workers 
compensation insurance. R69. The insurance carrier retained LWP Solutions, Inc. 
("LWP") to administer the payment of workers compensation benefits to Mr. 
Reese and to pay medical bills as they were incurred.2 
2
 LWP Solutions, Inc. would like to clarify its role in this litigation as there appears 
to be come confusion. LWP is not an insurance provider but is a third-party 
administrator that has been hired by the Utah Property and Casualty Guarantee 
Association ("UPCIGA"). UPCIGA has taken over payment of Mr. Reese's 
workers compensation claim in light of the fact that the workers compensation 
insurance company, Fremont Compensation Insurance Group/Freemont Indemnity 
Group, was liquidated in 2003. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202 et seq. 
(2006)(setting forth the role that UPCIGA plays in circumstances involving 
insolvent insurers). While LWP has been making payments to Mr. Reese and to 
others on his behalf, the money for such payments has been provided, at least in 
part, by UPCIGA or are funds to which UPCIGA is entitled to as a result of 
Fremont's liquidation. Accordingly, UPCIGA has a lien on proceeds recovered by 
Mr. Reese in his litigation against Tingey Construction. LWP is acting as 
UPCIGA's agent in this matter and is afforded the same protections and 
obligations as UPCIGA pursuant to Utah Statute. 
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Subsequently, Mr. Reese retained his own counsel and filed suit against 
Tingey Construction ("Tingey"). R2. In that suit, Mr. Reese argued that Tingey 
had negligently constructed the temporary railing and that had the temporary 
railing been properly constructed, he would not have fallen. R2. Tingey defended 
the suit by stating that Mr. Reese was at fault and that his recovery was reduced by 
his own negligence. R16. 
In the fall of 2005, Mr. Reese contacted LWP and asked for a break down of 
the money it had paid to Mr. Reese in workers compensation benefits and medical 
bills. Mr. Reese then asked if LWP would reduce the amount of its lien so as to 
facilitate settlement of Mr. Reese's suit against Tingey. At Mr. Reese's urging, 
LWP agreed to participate in a mediation of the dispute between Tingey and Mr. 
Reese that was to occur on December 30, 2005. R127. Paul Felt acted as the 
mediator.3 R77. 
Near the end of the mediation, LWP was presented with a Memorandum of 
Understanding that purported to set forth the terms of the agreement with the 
parties. LWP refused to sign because the memorandum contained a term to which 
3
 Over objection and at the trial court's insistence, LWP submitted an affidavit of 
its counsel recounting the events that took place at the mediation from her 
perspective. R126-13. The submission of this affidavit at the hearing should not 
be seen as a waiver of LWP's objection to being asked to provide testimony 
regarding what occurred at the mediation. LWP introduced this evidence only 
because the trial court insisted. LWP has taken caution to limit reference to the 
any information contained in that affidavit. 
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LWP had not agreed. LWP's counsel advised Mr. Reese, Tingey and the mediator 
that there was no agreement with LWP. Tingey left the mediation and LWP and 
Mr. Reese remained to further negotiate a settlement. Ultimately, no reso lution 
was reached and LWP left the mediation without executing the Memorandum of 
Understanding or any other written document. LWP informed Mr. Reese that no 
agreement had been reached prior to leaving. 
Following the mediation, LWP wrote Mr. Reese several letters reiterating its 
position that no agreement had been reached at the mediation. R91 -94 Moreover, 
LWP cautioned Mr. Reese that pursuant to Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999), mediation discussions were confidential and could not be used by 
Mr. Reese to enforce any alleged oral agreement. R91 -92. Despite LWP's 
warnings that the content of the mediation was confidential, Mr. Reese filed a Joint 
Motion to Enforce Settlement.4 R54. 
The trial court heard oral argument on the motio n to enforce settlement on 
May 22, 2006. R213. At the hearing, LWP reasserted its argument that the parties 
had not reached any agreement. LWP further argued that Mr. Reese was 
4
 Below, Mr. Reese made much of the fact that Tingey Construction Inc. 
("Tingey") joined in the motion to enforce. LWP had very little contact with 
Tingey during the mediation and never discussed the terms of any purported 
settlement with Mr. Reese with any representative of Tingey. Consequently, 
Tingey can only testify about what Mr. Reese told it or about its own suppositions; 
but it possesses no first-hand knowledge of any discussion between LWP and Mr. 
Reese. Its joinder in the motion to enforce is of limited significance. 
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prohibited from revealing confidential mediation discussions pursuant to Uta h 
Code Ann. §78-3lb-08. 
The trial court found as follows: "Mediation discussions contain both 
"confidential" and "non-confidential" discussions and that LWP's counsel would 
be deposed about the mediation. R179-181. The trial court held that "the scope of 
the deposition shall consist of the content of the mediation, including the process 
of the mediation and conversations and agreements that were made during the 
mediation." R179-181. LWP sought an interlocutory appeal to prevent its counsel 
from being deposed and to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation among the 
parties. R206. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mediation discussions are confidential pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78 -
3 lb-08, Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, and Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court erred 
when it ordered that LWP's counsel could be deposed regarding confidential 
mediation discussions. The courts are not to delve into confidential mediation 
discussions to determine whether an oral agreement was reached during mediation. 
The bright-line rule is that oral agreements made during a mediation will not be 
enforced by the courts and that parties need to protect themselves and reduce all 
agreements to some form of writing prior to the end of the mediation. See Lyons 
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v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). LWP refused to execute any 
"Memorandum of Understanding" that was presented to it at the end of the 
mediation because the memorandum contained a term to which it did not agree. 
LWP communicated its refusal plainly to the others at the mediation. This is 
conclusive proof that the parties do not have an enforceable agreement since 
parties to mediation may withdraw at any point prior to the executi on of a written 
summary of the agreement.5 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
In his motion, Mr. Reese attempts to enforce a settlement agreement that 
was never reached. It appears that the Plaintiff and the Defendant came to some 
sort of resolution during the mediation, but it is clear that no such agreement was 
reached with LWP. R88. Prior to leaving the mediation on December 30, 2005, 
counsel for LWP made it clear to all involved that LWP did not agree to the terms 
of the settlement set forth in the document drafted b y the mediator, Paul Felt. R88. 
5
 If required to do so, LWP could introduce evidence to show that there was no 
meeting of the minds between LWP and Mr. Reese. The lack of a meeting of the 
minds between the parties is evidenced by LWP's refusal to execute the document 
presented to it at the end of the mediation on the grounds that it contained a term to 
which it did not agree. Upon review of this document and the specific language 
therein, LWP recognized immediately that Mr. Reese had incorrectly set forth an 
agreement between the two parties. LWP notified the participants immediately of 
the error but Mr. Reese insisted that this term had been fully discussed even though 
LWP was certain that the term had not been discussed. The parties failed to reach 
any meeting of the minds and the alleged oral agreement is unenforceable on this 
ground as well. 
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LWP's counsel refused to execute the written agreement because it contained a 
term to which LWP did not agree. Ibid. 
Mr. Reese argues (1) that LWP is not entitled to the benefits of 
confidentiality in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8 because it was not a "party" to the 
suit and because the portion of the mediation needed to prove the existence of an 
oral agreement is not confidential, and (2) that no written document is necessary to 
bind a party to alleged agreements made in mediation, because other jurisdictions 
enforce oral agreements in mediation. 
Mr. Reese is mistaken in each assertion and the trial court erred in allowing 
him to introduce evidence regarding an alleged oral agreement and erred in 
ordering that LWP's counsel be deposed regarding confidential mediation 
discussions. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling that LWP's counsel 
be deposed regarding confidential mediation discussions. The Court should 
remand with direction that Mr. Reese's motion to enforce be dismissed with 
prejudice for lack of admissible evidence to support his claim. 
A. LWP's Participation in the Mediation Entitles it to Treat all Portions 
of the Mediation as Confidential. 
1. Both the Benefits and the Burdens of Confidentiality Apply to LWP. 
Below, Mr. Reese argued that Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8 (2) did not apply to 
LWP. Mr. Reese argued that the confidentiality requirement set forth in Section 
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78-3 lb-8(2) only prohibited admission of confidential statement at a subsequent 
"trial of the same case or same issues between the same parties." R213:14:9-24. 
Mr. Reese's legal argument is flawed. Utah Code Section 78-3 lb-8 does 
provided at (2) that "[n]o evidence concerning the fact, conduct, or result of an 
ADR proceeding may be subject to discovery or admissible at any subsequent 
trial...," but it also provides that confidentiality applies to all persons present at the 
mediation, including lien holders such as LWP. Id. 
Subsection (4) provides "no person attending an ADR proce eding .. . may 
disclose or be required to disclose any information obtained in the course of an 
ADR proceeding." Id The plain language of this statute states that the facts, 
conduct, or result of a mediation are confidential. There is no limit as to w ho is 
bound by the mandate of confidentiality because the legislature used the word 
"person," not parties, as Mr. Reese argues. 
Moreover, if the Court were to adopt Mr. Reese's reasoning it could be 
argued that LWP would not be entitled to the benefits of confidentiality under Utah 
law because it was not named as a "party" to this suit at the time of the mediation. 
This is an absurd result and is not what the Legislature intended. As the plain 
language of § 78-31b-8(4) provides, everyone who participates in mediation must 
adhere to the confidentiality requirements. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. All Mediation Discussions Are Confidential. 
Similarly, there is no basis in law or fact to support the trial court's finding 
that there are "confidential" and "non confidential" portions of mediation. R178. 
The plain language of § 78-3 lb-8 states that mediation is confidential. The statute 
does not distinguish between aspects of mediation as the trial court found or as Mr. 
Reese argues. Instead, all mediation discussions are treated as equally 
confidential. 
Furthermore, both the trial court and Mr. Reese ignore the fact that the Utah 
Court of Appeals has previously ruled that mediation discussions are confidential 
and did not distinguish between "confidential" and "non -confidential" portions of 
mediation in making its ruling. In Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the confidentiality of statements made 
during a court-ordered mediation. In that case, the parties had been sent to 
mediation on appeal. See id. at 1143. The Appellant subsequently filed a motion 
with the appeals court seeking to enforce an agreement allegedly reached during 
mediation or, in the alternative, for return of monies tendered in furtherance of 
settlement. See id. The Court of Appeals refused to hear the motion on the 
ground that it does not hear new evidence. See id. The issue regarding the 
enforcement of the settlement was remanded to the trial court for hearing. See id 
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at 1143-44. The Court of Appeals discussed at length the procedure to be 
followed on remand. See id. at 1144. 
The Court stated as follows: 
In the course of proceedings on remand, pursuant to the 
prior order of this court, neither counsel nor parties may 
disclose to any court, in argument, briefs, or otherwise, 
statements or comments made during the initial 
mediation conference or in related discussions involving 
the appellate mediator thereafter. We interpret this 
prohibition to apply equally to notes or other memoranda 
of such statements or comments. This restriction applies 
with equal force to the appellate mediator in the unlikely 
event that she should be asked to participate in any way 
in the proceeding on remand. 
IdL at 1144 (footnote omitted)(emphasis original). The Court in Lyons stated, 
"' guarantee of confidentiality is essential to the proper functioning of a . . . 
settlement conference program.'" Id. at 114 (quoting Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 
F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992)). "'[Participants must trust that matters discussed 
at a conference will not be revealed to the judges.'" Id. 
The same reasoning applies to the case at bar. Mr. Reese, in error, revealed 
to the trial court the content of confidential settlement negotiations between LWP, 
himself and Tingey. Pursuant to the reasoning in Lyons, Mr. Reese may not rely 
upon such evidence in pursuing his motion and may be admonished or sanctioned 
by the Court for doing so. 
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LWP agreed to participate in the mediation between Tingey and Mr. Reese 
because it realized that its lien would impact settlement between the parties. It 
negotiated in good faith throughout the mediation, but a resolution was not 
reached. That LWP failed to sign any written agreement drafted by Mr. Reese is 
conclusive evidence that no agreement was reached. R88. LWP agreed to 
participate in this mediation because it trusted that all statements made therein 
would be kept confidential unless agreed to by the parties. 
Thus, the trial court erred in interpreting § 78 -3 lb-8 as not prohibiting the 
introduction of evidence to prove a purported oral agreement reached during 
mediation. "Matters of statutory construction . . . are questions of law that" are 
"review[ed] for correctness." Anderson v. United Parcel Service, 96 P.3d 903, 
906 (Utah 2004). Accordingly, this Court need provide no deference to the trial 
court's interpretation of § 78 -3 lb-8. The plain language of § 78-3 lb-8(4) provides 
that all participants to mediation are bound by the obligation and benefit of 
confidentiality. Similarly, there is no language in the statute that supports the trial 
court's distinguishing between "confidential" and "non -confidential" mediation 
discussions. The trial court's interpretation of § 78-3 lb-8 is in error and should be 
reversed. 
Interestingly, Mr. Reese does not dispute that Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d at 
1143, is binding precedent that mediation discussions must remain confidential. 
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Mr. Reese merely states that LWP's counsel is not ordered to discuss confidential 
mediation discussion, but instead, is ordered to discuss non-confidential mediation 
discussions. R213:14:9-24. This argument begs the question and ignores that the 
Utah Legislature, in § 78-3 lb-8, and the Utah Court of Appeals, in Lyons, have 
determined that all mediation discussions are confidential. 
Mr. Reese also argues that the trial court provided sufficient guidance 
regarding LWP's counsel's deposition because it directed that counsel need only 
testify about "non-confidential" statements. This begs the question of which 
statements are confidential. Moreover, the trial court has put LWP's counsel in the 
awkward and unnecessary position of being a witness in her own case. It is not 
clear the extent to which the trial court has abrogated the rule of confidentiality in 
mediations. By ruling that there are "confidential" and "non-confidential" 
components to mediation, the trial court has created a dispute in each case where 
mediation does not result in a written settlement agreement. It is now unclear what 
statements during mediation will be given protection and which ones will not since 
"the content of the mediation, including the process of the mediation and 
conversations and agreements that were made in the mediation" are discoverable. 
R179. The trial court's rule is unworkable. This is why § 78-3lb-8 is most 
reasonably interpreted as a "bright line" rule that all mediation discussions are 
confidential. 
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If the trial court's ruling is allowed to stand, it would be unclear where the 
line will be drawn regarding discovery into discussions from a mediation. Will the 
mediator be compelled to testify in direct opposition to his or her oath? Will 
statements made by attorneys during mediation be discoverable and used at trial? 
Should LWP be allowed to depose Mr. Reese's attorney regarding the mediation? 
Should the attorneys be disqualified from representing their clients if they must 
testify regarding discussion in a mediation? Should written discovery regarding 
mediation be allowed? These questions highlight that the decision t o require 
LWP's attorney to be deposed is a procedural error that has far reaching 
ramifications. The rules of mediation require confidentiality and require that 
agreements reached in mediation be reduced to writing so as to render these 
questions moot. 
B. Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Makes 
Clear that the Agreements Made In Mediations Must Be Reduced to 
Writing to be Enforceable. 
"Statutory Construction is a question of law and is reviewed by the Court de 
novo. When interpreting court rules, we apply our rules of statutory construction 
with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are passed as a whole and not in 
parts or sections. [0]ur primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the 
rule-making body and to render all parts [of the rule] relevant and meaningful." 
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Cox v. Krammer, 76 P.3d 184, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)(alterations original). 
L Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Requires That Agreements be Reduced to 
Writing. 
Mr. Reese improperly relies upon confidential statements and comments 
made during the course of the mediation to support his claim that an oral 
agreement was reached. The plain language of Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of 
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution mandates that agreements reached 
during mediation be reduced to writing. vcRule 101 provides: 
[I]n the event that a settlement to all issues is reached 
during the mediation conference, the participat ing parties 
or the mediator shall prepare, and the parties shall 
execute, a written settlement agreement and resolution of 
the action. In the event that a resolution of less than all 
of the issues is reached, the parties shall prepare and 
execute a stipulation concerning those issues that were 
resolved and identifying those issues that remain in 
dispute. 
Id. This language unequivocally requires that agreements " shall" be reduced to 
writing. Id. Here, LWP refused to execute the document presented to it because it 
contained a term to which it did not agree. The agreement (if any) was not reduced 
to writing and is not enforceable pursuant to the plain language of Rule 101. 
Moreover, such an interpretation of Rule 101 is consistent with other 
provisions of the rule that allow parties to disengage from mediation at any point 
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prior to when a document is signed. Rule 101 states in relevant part, "During the 
pre-mediation conference, the mediator shall inform the parties of their right to 
withdraw from the mediation process before a final settlement agreement is 
signed." Rule 10 L supra. (Emphasis added). 
Here, LWP informed all involved, before a final settlement was signed, that 
no agreement had been reached. LWP exercised its right to "withdraw from the 
mediation process" at a point prior to the execution of a written document. Id 
LWP acted within the power granted it via Rule 101 when it refused to sign the 
proposed "Memorandum of Understanding" because it contained a term to which it 
did not agree. In essence, LWP disengaged from the mediation process without 
reaching a resolution. 
Lastly, Rule 101 provides that "[t]he mediation conference should proceed 
in a fashion that furthers the goal of the mediation process, preserves 
confidentiality, and encourages candor on the part of the participating parties." Id 
Obviously, the rule intended for all discussions within mediation to remain 
confidential. There is no distinction made between "confidential" and "non -
confidential" portions of the mediation as the trial court and Mr. Reese advance. 
LWP acknowledges that requiring, parties to draft and execute a "complete" 
settlement agreement at the close of each mediation would be an unreasonable 
burden; however, it is within custom and practice (and the abili ty of the parties) to 
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reduce the essential terms to writing and have all participants execute the 
document. The plain language of Rule 101 mandates this course of action. 
Here, it became clear when reviewing the "Memorandum of Understanding" 
drafted by the mediator that the document contained a term to which LWP did not 
agree. R88. It was for this reason that LWP's counsel refused to sign the 
document. R88. Pursuant to Rule 101, LWP is free to withdraw from the 
mediation process at any time prior to execution of the written settlement 
agreement. Id Most importantly, LWP immediately made it clear to all the parties 
involved that the written document contained a term to which it did not agree. 
LWP informed the Plaintiff, the Defendant and the mediator prior to the end of the 
mediation that LWP would not execute the written settlement agreement because it 
contained a term to which it did not agree. R88. It would be unconscionable for 
LWP to be bound to an agreement to which it did not agree. 
2. Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence Plainly States That 
Statements Made in Settlement Negotiations Are Not Admissible 
Evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 408, which is identical to the federal rule, 
excludes from evidence statements made in the course of settlement negotiations. 
Mr. Reese, Tingey Construction, LWP and each of their respective counsels 
participated in a mediation for the purpose of settlement of this suit. No statements 
or comments made by any of the parties to the mediation can be submitted as 
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evidence to the Court. All such evidence in the moving papers and supporting 
affidavits should be stricken. 
The cornerstone of the mediation process is that all discussions that occur 
within the mediation are confidential. This promotes open dialo gue and, 
hopefully, settlement of the suit. Mr. Reese cited several cases to the trial court in 
its motion to enforce this purported settlement agreement but what Mr. Reese 
failed to note was that not one of the cases that he referenced as a basis for 
enforcing an oral agreement dealt with mediation. Mr. Reese has provided no 
legal support for his claim that an oral agreement (if one was actually reached, 
which LWP Solutions denies) can be enforced in the context of a mediation. The 
reason no such case exists, is because the rules regarding mediation are clearly set 
forth and require a written agreement in order for it to be binding. Otherwise, the 
rules would not allow for a party to a mediation to withdraw from the mediation at 
any given point in time prior to the execution of a written document. What 
Plaintiff fails to recognize is that when a party participates in a mediation, that 
party voluntarily suspends its constitutional right to a jury trial. Requiring a 
written agreement at the close of a mediation is a "safety net" that allows parties 
only to knowingly waive their right to a jury trial. This reasoning is supported by 
cases found in other jurisdictions. 
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C. Courts from Other Jurisdictions Likewise Treat Mediations as 
Confidential and This Court Should Follow Its Own Precedent 
and The Lead of Other Jurisdictions and Find All Mediation 
Discussions Confidential and Oral Agreements Not Enforceable. 
In Vernon v. Action, 732 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Ind. 2000), the Supreme Court of 
Indiana addressed whether an agreement allegedly reached in a mediation, but not 
reduced to writing, was enforceable. The court concluded that "the mediator's 
testimony regarding the alleged oral settlement agreement was confidential and 
privileged and that it was not admissible pursuant to the A.D.R. Rules incorporated 
in the parties' written agreement to mediate." Id. at 806. 
In Vernon, the parties participated in a voluntary pre-suit mediation pursuant 
to a written agreement that established the conditions of the me diation. "The 
agreement required confidentiality in conformity with state law and Supreme Court 
Rule," id at 807 (footnote omitted), and incorporated the A.D.R. Rules.6 An 
agreement was allegedly reached during the mediation but later the plaintiff denied 
the existence of such agreement. See id. at 806. The defendants filed a motion to 
6
 It appears that the A.D.R. rules do not apply to mediations in Indiana which are 
not "instituted pursuant to judicial action in a pending case." Vernon v. Action, 
732 N.E.2d 805, 808, fn 5 (Ind. 2000). This inquiry is not relevant here because 
this mediation arose from an action pending in the third judicial district court. 
Also different from Utah, the A.D.R. rules in Indiana state that '"Mediation shall 
be regarded as settlement negotiations as governed by Indiana Evidence Rule 
408.'" Id. at 808-09. While LWP argues that settlement discussion within the 
confines of mediation are subject to Evidence Rule 408 exclusion, nether the Utah 
statutes nor the A.D.R. rules of Utah are as explicit as the Indiana rules on this 
point. It is noteworthy, however, that legislatures from this jurisdiction made this 
explicit. 
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enforce settlement with the trial court. See id. The trial court allowed evidence 
from the parties regarding mediation discussion and the insurance adjuster for the 
defendant, the mediator, the attorneys and both parties testified about the 
mediation. See id. The trial court then concluded that the parties had reached an 
agreement during the mediation and enforced such agreement. See id. The 
plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred when it admitted the 
evidence "in contravention of the parties' mediation agreement, A.D.R. Rule 2.12, 
and Indiana Evidence Rule 408." Id. 
The Indiana Supreme Court noted that "in general, settlement agreements 
need not be in writing to be enforceable. However, when a settlement is reached in 
mediation, the mediation rules require that 'it shall be reduced to writing and 
signed.'" Id at 809 (internal citations omitted). The court noted that "[bjecause of 
the nature of the mediation process and its significant and increasing role, 
considerable attention has been given to whether claims of oral mediation 
settlement agreements should be enforceable." See id. Relying upon comments 
made by participants at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Law, the appellate court acknowledged that the written agreement reached by 
participants was exempt from confidentiality requirements, however, oral 
statements made during the mediation were not exempt. See id. The Court 
reasoned as follows: 
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[The exception from confidentiality for a final written 
document] is noteworthy only for what it does not 
include: oral agreements. The disadvantage of 
exempting oral settlements is that nearly everything said 
during a mediation session could bear on either whether 
the disputants came to an agreement or the content of the 
agreement. In other words, an exception for oral 
agreements has the potential to swallow the rule. As a 
result, mediation participants might be less candid, not 
knowing whether a controversy later would erupt over an 
oral agreement. . . . However, because the majority of 
courts and statutes limit the confidentiality exception to 
signed written agreements, one would expect that 
mediators and others will soon incorporated knowledge 
of a writing requirement into their practices. 
Id. at 809-10 (citations omitted); see also Uniform Mediation Act, Section 
6(a)(l)(2001) at http: //www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/UMAfinal.pdf. 
The Vernon Court adopted this reasoning. See id. The appellate court 
acknowledged the "importance of ensuring the enforceability of agreements that 
result from mediation," but it found other goals to be more important "including: 
facilitating agreements that result from mutual ass ent, achieving complete 
resolutions of disputes, and producing clear understandings that the parties are less 
likely to dispute or challenge." Id at 810. The court reasoned that the goals of 
promoting settlement was "fostered by disfavoring oral agreem ents." Id. 
"Requiring written agreements, signed by the parties, is more likely to maintain 
mediation as a viable avenue for clear and enduring dispute resolution rather than 
one leading to further uncertainty and conflict." Id; see also Clark v. Stapleton 
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Corp., 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that for federal mediation 
program to work "participants must trust that matters discussed at a conference 
will not be revealed to the judges.") 
Similarly, in In re Acceptance Insurance Company, 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 2000), the court entertained a writ of mandamus to address the error of 
allowing parties to testify at trial regarding confidential mediation discussions. 
Relying upon a Texas statute, the court held that "communications made by a 
participant to mediation relating to the subject matter of the dispute are 
'confidential, [are] not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence 
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding."' Id at 452 
(citations omitted)(modifications original). The court concluded that "[t]he trial 
court. . . abused its discretion by violating the confidentiality provisions of the 
ADR Act in requiring realtor's representative to testify about the manner in which 
she negotiated and her communications with other participants and with other 
representatives of realtor during the mediations." Id at 454; compare to Reno v. 
Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Where agreement within 
confines of mediation was enforced because the mediator had taken handwritten 
notes and the parties signed these notes in lieu of a more formal document, but still 
requiring some form of writing that "contain the terms to which the parties 
agreed".); Spencer v. Spencer. 72 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (where 
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agreement within confines of mediation that was dictated by mediator at the end of 
the mediation but one party thought she would be given the chance to review this 
dictation prior to signature was found not enforceable until it had been si gned by 
the parties). 
In Wilmington Hospital L.L.C. v. New Castle County, 788 A.2d 536 (Del. 
Ch. 2001), a hotel corporation brought suit against a county that refused to issue a 
certificate of occupancy. The parties mediated the dispute. Id. at 539 - 40. 
Subsequently, the hotel sought to enforce a settlement agreement that it claimed 
was reached in the mediation. The court relied upon local court rule to find that 
statements made in mediation were confidential and could not be relied upon by 
the party seeking to enforce the purported settlement agreement. Id at 540. The 
court noted that the party seeking to enforce the settlement, "improperly introduces 
and relies on confidential written and oral communications made in connection 
with the mediation." Id at 541. The court further noted that "it is inconsistent 
with the public policy favoring voluntary mediation for a court to entertain a 
motion to enforce a mediation settlement agreement that is not reduced to writing 
and signed by the parties to the mediation and the mediator." Id The court 
continued that "[confidentiality of all communications between parties or among 
them and the mediator serves the important public policy of promoting a broad 
discussion of potential resolutions. . . .Without the expectation of confidentiality, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parties would hesitate to propose compromise solutions out of concern that they 
would later be prejudiced by their disclosure." Id Finally, the court stated as 
follows: "[I]t is consistent with the purpose of Rule 174 to interpret subpart (g) 
thereof as requiring that any settlement agreement between the parties to the 
mediation be reduced to writing and signed by them and the mediator as a 
condition for enforceability. As this proceeding itself well illustrates, it is 
reasonable to expect that such a bright-line rule is the best way to protect the 
confidentiality of the mediation when disputes arise over the terms of a putative 
settlement." Id at 542-42. 
In Ryan v. Garcia, 33 Cal.Rpt.2d 158, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), purchasers 
of a home who had sued for negligent construction and fraud sought to enforce a 
purported oral agreement reached during mediation. It appears that the mediator 
spoke with each party separately and only combined the group to announce t hat a 
settlement had been reached. See id. at 160. During this "joint" session, someone 
(not identified) recited the terms of the settlement and defendant's attorney was 
asked to reduce the agreement to writing. See id. However, "the parties later 
disagreed concerning the terms of the settlement and no written agreement was 
ever executed." Id. at 1008. 
The court in Ryan considered whether the oral agreement to settle could be 
enforced. The court held that'"Confidentiality is absolutely essential to 
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mediation." IdL at 161 (citations omitted). "'Otherwise, parties would be reluctant 
to make the kinds of concessions and admissions that pave the way to settlement.'" 
Id. The party seeking to enforce the purported agreement argued that only 
statements "'in the course of mediation'" are protected and not statements made at 
the conclusion of the mediation. IcL (Citations omitted). The court was not 
persuaded and rejected the suggestion that it was suppose to decide which portions 
of the mediation were confidential and which were not. See id. The Court stated 
as follows: 
Judicial sifting of statements made at a confidential 
mediation to select those which can be used as evidence 
of an agreement contravenes the legislative intent 
underlying adoption [of ADR rules.] Indeed, the risk of 
this judicial sifting would deter some litigants from 
participating freely and openly in mediation. . . .To 
condone further judicial proceedings to enforce oral 
agreements made during mediation directly undercuts the 
effect of the statute intended by the Legislature. 
By using the broad phrase "in the course of the 
mediation" the Legislature manifested its intent to protect 
a broach range of statements from later use as evidence 
in litigation. To establish arbitrary bound aries within the 
general process of'mediation/with a vague delineation 
between what is included and what is not included, is 
contrary to that intent and may not be inferred from the 
language of the statute. 
Furthermore, narrow interpretation woul d lead the 
trial courts to filer the mediation proceedings to 
determine if any portion of the proceeding crossed the 
line [into non-confidential]. This is the type of disclosure 
and use of statements made in mediation the 
confidentiality statute is meant to preclude. 
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Id at 161. 
Most importantly, the court noted that if oral mediation settlements were 
enforceable, it would be "costly and time-consuming." Id at 162. Allowing for 
oral mediation settlement "permits full-blown trials to determine, in each 
mediation case, if there was an oral agreement and, if so, on what terms. [The 
ADR rules], however, provide[] broad confidentiality in the expectation of 
alleviating the need for ponderous judicial proceedings." Id; see also Regents of 
the University of California v. Sumner, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996) (noting that oral discussion after mediation had concluded was not subject to 
the same confidentiality protections as statements within mediation). 
As is clear from each of these cases, courts from other jurisdictions believe 
that allowing enforcement of disputed oral agreements contravenes the public 
policy behind mediation.7 As proposed by the court in Wilmington Hospital, a 
"bright-line" approach is most prudent. Failure to draw such a bright-line will put 
the trial court in the role as evaluator of mediation discussions so as to distinguish 
between those things which are confidential and those which are not. The district 
court in this case proposed that very rule in this case. As these courts in 
7
 Obviously, there is no prohibition against the voluntary adherence to an oral 
agreement reached in mediation when there is no dispute between the parties. 
However, it is unlikely that court intervention would ever be necessary if the 
parties had no dispute so this question is unlikely to arise and is not before the 
court here. 
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Wilmington Hospital, Ryan, Vernon and In re Acceptance, eloquently stated, this 
is an unworkable rule. 
IX. Conclusion 
For each of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order that Mr. Reese 
could introduce evidence to support an alleged ora 1 agreement reached in 
mediation and that LWP's counsel could be deposed regarding confidential 
mediation discussions is in error and should be reversed. Section 78 -3 lb-8 
provides that all mediation discussions are confidential and does not allow for an 
exception to this confidentiality to prove the existence of an alleged oral 
agreement. Similarly, § 78-3 lb-8 does not make a distinction between 
"confidential" and "non-confidential" mediation discussions. LWP respectfully 
requests that the trial court be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the trial 
court with direction that Mr. Reese's motion to enforce be dismissed with 
prejudice for lack of admissible evidence in support thereof. 
X. Oral Argument 
This matter presents a matter of first impression for the Utah Supreme Court as 
only the Utah Court of Appeals has issued an opinion regarding the confidentiality 
of mediation discussions. See Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). For this reason, oral argument on the matter is reque sted. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this 10th day of November 2006. 
TIM DALTON DUNN, Esq. 
S. GRACE ACOSTA, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
Facsimile: (801)521-9998 
Attorneys for LWP Solutions 
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XL Addendum 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 
§ 78-31b-8. Confidentiality 
(1) ADR proceedings shall be conducted in a manner that encourages informal and 
confidential exchange among the persons present to facilitate resolution of the 
dispute or a part of the dispute. ADR proceedings shall be closed unless the parties 
agree that the proceedings be open. ADR proceedings shall not be recorded. 
(2) No evidence concerning the fact, conduct, or result of an ADR proceeding may 
be subject to discovery or admissible at any subsequent trial of the same case or 
same issues between the same parties. 
(3) No party to the case may introduce as evidence information obtained during an 
ADR proceeding unless the information was discovered from a source 
independent of the ADR proceeding. 
(4) Unless all parties and the neutral agree, no person attending an ADR 
proceeding, including the ADR provider or ADR organization, may disclose or be 
required to disclose any information obtained in the course of an ADR proceeding, 
including any memoranda, notes, records, or work product. 
(5) Except as provided, an ADR provider or ADR organization may not disclose 
or discuss any information about any ADR proceeding to anyone outside the 
proceeding, including the judge or judges to whom the case may be assigned. An 
ADR provider or an ADR organization may communicate information about an 
ADR proceeding with the director for the purposes of training, program 
management, or program evaluation and when consulting with a peer. In making 
those communications, the ADR provider or ADR organization shall render 
anonymous all identifying information. 
(6) Nothing in this section limits or affects the responsibility to report child abuse 
or neglect in accordance with Section 62A-4a-403. 
(7) No records of ADR proceedings under this act [FN1] or under Title 78, 
Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, shall be subject to Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act, except settlement agreements 
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filed with the court after conclusion of an ADR proceeding or awards filed with 
the court after the period for filing a demand for trial de novo has expired. 
Laws 1994, c. 228, § 10; Laws 2000, c. 288, § 7, eff. July 1, 2000; Laws 2004, c. 
90, §96, eff. May 3, 2004. 
RULE 408. COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or 
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its 
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is 
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence 
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise 
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
RULE 101. CONDUCT OF MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS 
(a) Selection of Mediator. The mediator shall be selected as provided in Code of 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-510(11). 
(b) Pre-mediation Conference. Within 10 days following selection, and after 
consultation with the participating parties or their counsel, the mediator shall 
conduct a pre-mediation conference and schedule the place, date and time of the 
mediation conference. The pre-mediation conference may be conducted by 
telephone, with the parties individually, or together. During the pre-mediation 
conference, the mediator shall inform the parties of their right to withdraw from 
the mediation process before a final settlement agreement is signed. The mediation 
conference should be held within 45 days of the pre-mediation conference. The 
parties may agree to conduct discovery pursuant to paragraph (f). The mediator 
may request that the parties exchange and/or submit a disclosure statement prior to 
the mediation conference. 
(c) Mediation Conference. The mediation conference shall commence at the 
place, date, and time agreed upon by the mediator and the parties. All parties shall 
be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the authority to fully settle, 
all relevant issues in the case. The mediator shall conduct the mediation 
n A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conference and determine the length and timing of sessions and recesses, and the 
order and manner of presentation of the issues. The mediation conference should 
proceed in a fashion that furthers the goals of the mediation process, preserves 
confidentiality, and encourages candor on the part of participating parties. The 
mediator should serve as a neutral facilitator, assisting the parties in defining and 
narrowing the issues and encouraging each party to examine the dispute from 
various perspectives, without undertaking to decide any issue, make findings of 
fact, or impose any agreement. 
(d) Separate Consultation With Parties During the Mediation Conference. 
During the mediation conference, the mediator may meet or consult separately 
with one or more participating parties, or may divide the conference into groups of 
fewer than all the parties. Information disclosed to the mediator on a confidential 
basis during separate consultation shall not be disclosed to other parties without 
the disclosing partyfs consent. 
(e) Settlement. In the event that a settlement to all issues is reached during the 
mediation conference, the participating parties or the mediator shall prepare, and 
the parties shall execute, a written settlement agreement and promptly file with the 
clerk of the court any documents appropriate for resolution of the action. In the 
event that a resolution of less than all of the issues is reached, the parties shall 
prepare and execute a stipulation concerning those issues that were resolved and 
identifying those issues that remain in dispute. Upon filing of the stipulation with 
the clerk, the case shall be withdrawn from the ADR program. 
(f) Discovery. Discovery may proceed during the pendency of the mediation 
proceedings, except as stipulated by the parties. Subpoenas for the production of 
evidence by nonparties may be issued, served and enforced by the court as 
provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(g) Termination. If the mediator determines that the parties are unable to 
participate meaningfully in the process or that a reasonable agreement is unlikely 
to be achieved, the mediator may suspend or terminate the mediation process 
without explanation. The parties may terminate the proceedings at any time. 
(h) Absent Parties. Upon written recommendation by the mediator or motion by 
any party, the court may order absent parties to show cause why they failed to 
attend the mediation conference and, if appropriate, why sanctions should not be 
imposed. 
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(i) Change to Arbitration. At any time prior to the conclusion of the mediation 
proceedings, the parties may agree to submit the matter to arbitration. Written 
notice signed by all parties and counsel of such agreement shall be sent to the 
Director. Selection of an arbitrator shall be governed by Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-510(11). The parties may by agreement request that the 
mediator serve as an arbitrator. 
(j) No interlocutory appeal may be taken from an order granting or denying a 
motion to refer a civil action pending on January 1, 1995 to the ADR program. 
[Adopted effective January 1, 1995; amended effective November 1, 1996.] 
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